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Client-Side Link Selection Validation

ABSTRACT
A method for reducing unintentional user clicks due to reflow and clickjacking in mobile
apps. Links in electronic documents such as web pages may be marked as special or protected.
When a protected link is present, the document presentation environment prevents selection of
links that exhibit untrustworthy behavior, which might have been clicked by accident in an
attempt to select the protected link. Examples of untrustworthy behavior include repositioning
the link just prior to the link selection or presenting the link in a transparent manner.

DETAIL
Personal computers, tablets, mobile “smart” phones, and other such computing devices
execute applications that can present electronic documents to a user of the computing device.
The electronic documents include content, typically received from a server, that may also include
interactive elements that, when activated, cause the device to request or retrieve additional
content. The user device may retrieve such content from a server, resulting in a client/server
paradigm where the user device is a client device. The interactive elements in the content may
include selectable elements such as webpage hyperlinks and actionable buttons. Examples of
selectable elements include webpage hyperlinks, form submission buttons, social media “like” or
“share” type buttons, e-commerce “purchase” or “buy” type buttons, and so forth. These
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applications may present content from multiple sources, which may include third-party content
(e.g., advertisements, shared content, social content, etc.). In some instances, the application, the
electronic document, or the interactive content may include functional elements that can present
third-party content supplied by a server. In some instances, the server may select what thirdparty content to present. In some instances, the application, the electronic document, or the
interactive content may allow, intentionally or unintentionally, for third-party content to be
presented in place over a selectable element of the interactive content. As a result, an attempt by
a user to select the covered element of the interactive content may be intercepted or redirected to
a third-party link. This is referred to as “clickjacking.”
Applications that present content with interactive elements include web-browsers, e-book
readers, news-readers, electronic mail (e-mail) managers, media players, games, utilities, and so
forth. An example form of interactive content is a web page, e.g., an electronic document
formatted in accordance with the hypertext markup language (HTML) that may include dynamic
elements (e.g., JavaScript) and actionable or selectable elements such as hyperlinks to uniform
resource locators (URLs). The application may present interactive content that is local to the
client-side device or may receive the interactive content from a remote server via a network. In
some instances, the interactive content may include elements that dynamically update or retrieve
additional content once the interactive content is activated or loaded for presentation. In some
instances, the interactive content includes multi-media elements such as video, audio, or haptic
data. Presentation of the interactive content may include displaying text, image, or video content
on a screen or display. Presentation of the interactive content may include playing audio through
speakers. Presentation of the interactive content may include vibrating haptic feedback devices.
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In general, the concern with clickjacking is presentation of interactive content in which
an interaction, e.g., selection of a hyperlink, can be surreptitiously redirected by a third-party, for
example, by causing a user to inadvertently select a link different from one the user intended to
select. There are many ways in which a third-party link can be inadvertently selected when a
user attempts to select a link. For example, the third-party link can be placed in a re-locatable
“floating” presentation layer that moves into a display or presentation position layered above the
intended link (or selectable element encompassing the intended link). As another example, in
some applications, the third-party link can be presented in a transparent manner, e.g., within a
graphic that is fully transparent. In some applications, the third-party link can be very small,
effectively invisible to the user, e.g., by using a small number of display pixels.
Allowing third-party content to intercept or redirect user selections is not desirable. It
can erode user trust in the application or content source, frustrate users, and possibly place the
user or the client device at risk. For example, if the redirected link may cause the client device to
retrieve or download executable data from a third-party that could include a computer virus or
other malicious software (“malware”). As another example, the redirected link selection could
present information or data collection forms where the source is unclear, potentially confusing a
user into providing personal or confidential information to a third-party (this is a form of attack
known as “phishing”). Accordingly, it is desirable to prevent such inadvertent element
selections.
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An example of clickjacking is shown in FIG. 1. Illustrated in FIG. 1 are screenshot 100
and screenshot 104, each presenting content 125 in a display 120. The content 125 includes
selectable elements, e.g., up and down rating buttons and a comment button 130. The screenshot
100 includes expanding advertisement 140 and banner advertisement 142. The screenshot 104
includes an expanded advertisement 144 and the banner advertisement 142. The expanded
advertisement covers the selectable comment elements, e.g., causing the comment button 130 to
be obscured 134. The expanding advertisement 140 might, for example, expand after a
predetermined period of time, e.g., 5 seconds after the page loads, or after an event, e.g., a
mouse-over event, or after some other triggering condition, e.g., any movement of the mouse or
detection of a finger or stylus in close proximity to a screen, or after any other trigger event.
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An application developer could prevent clickjacking by avoiding third-party elements, or
by pre-screening all third-party elements. However, these “walled garden” approaches can be
onerous for the application developer and restrict what the developer can do with the application.
In some instances, for example, a developer may wish to sell space on a webpage to an
advertising network, where the advertising network chooses what ads to present on the webpage.
Some developers work in a collaborative environment, where some portions of an application or
electronic document are authored by different developers with different objectives or concerns.
For example, a content author may work with a webpage designer to present content, where the
author might not have editorial control over the final page design. Accordingly, it is desirable to
prevent clickjacking using a minimum of burden on application developers, webpage designers,
and other types of interactive content authors and architects.
The client device provides a host execution environment for the application, which is
responsible for processing network link selections. The host execution environment may
include, for example, the client device operating system and any dynamically loadable
application programming libraries used by the application. The host execution environment may
be an encapsulating application. That is, the document presentation application may be
executing within another hosting application. For example, the hosting application may be a web
browser and the document presentation application may be a dynamic page loaded by the web
browser. The host execution environment is well positioned to block link selections when a set
of suspect conditions exist. For example, a selectable element of an interactive content may be
marked as special and, when a link is selected that meets conditions indicating interference with
the special element, the host execution environment can determine that the link selection is
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suspect. The host execution environment can then either block the suspect link selection or take
a predefined action such as redirecting the suspect link selection to the special element.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method of determining whether to allow or reject a link
selection. In broad overview, at stage 210, an application executing in a host execution
environment on a client device generates a model of an electronic document. At stage 220, the
application receives or detects a link selection, which it then passes to the host execution
environment for processing. At stage 230, the host execution environment determines, from the
document model, whether the document includes a protected link. If not, the host execution
environment allows the link selection at stage 250. Otherwise, at stage 240, the host execution
environment determines whether the link selection satisfies additional “elevated” criteria. The
host execution environment then only allows the link selection at stage 250 if the link selection
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satisfies the elevated criteria at stage 240. Otherwise, at stage 260, the host execution
environment rejects the link selection.
Referring to the flowchart in FIG. 2 in more detail, at stage 210, an application executing
in a host execution environment on a client device generates a model of an electronic document.
For example, the application (e.g., a web browser application) may generate a document object
model (DOM) for the electronic document. Any document model can be used as long as it can
indicate which links (if any) are protected. In some implementations, a link is indicated as
protected by including a special tag. For example, the tag might be a “PROTECT” tag and
protected links (e.g., an HTML anchor) might read:
<A HREF=“LINK_URL” PROTECT=“1”>Link Text</A>
At stage 220, the application receives or detects a link selection, which it then passes to
the host execution environment for processing. A link might be selected, for example, by a user
tapping on a touch screen or clicking on a link using a mouse. In some instances, a link might be
selected using another interface. When the application detects the link selection, it passes the
selection to the execution environment for completion.
At stage 230, the host execution environment determines, from the document model,
whether the document includes a protected link. If not, the host execution environment allows
the link selection at stage 250. Otherwise, at stage 240, the host execution environment
determines whether the link selection satisfies additional “elevated” criteria.
At stage 240, the host execution environment determines whether the link selection
satisfies additional “elevated” criteria. The elevated criteria are configured to identify links that
exhibit untrustworthy behavior. For example, if a link is in an presentation element that moves
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or expands, this may suggest that the link is being repositioned to intercept a selection attempt.
Accordingly, the elevated criteria may identify links that have been repositioned or moved, links
that have been repositioned or moved within a specified time window prior to the selection
event, or links that have been repositioned or moved to within a specified presentation proximity
to the protected link. As another example, a link may be included with a visual presentation
element such as an image file. The image may be very small, e.g., a single pixel. Accordingly,
the elevated criteria may identify links associated with image files smaller than a specified
threshold size. The link may be presented transparently, e.g., in association with a transparent
image file. Accordingly, the elevated criteria may identify links associated with image files
having a transparency property. In some implementations, the elevated criteria may identify
links associated with image files having a transparency property that is more transparent that a
partial transparency threshold (e.g., more than 50% transparent). In some implementations, if the
selection event points to a destination (a URL) other than the destination indicated in the link
marked special, the selection event is blocked. Other behaviors may also suggest an attempt to
redirect user interactions and the criteria may test for these behaviors as well.
If the link selection satisfies the elevated criteria at stage 240, the host execution
environment then allows the link selection at stage 250. Otherwise, at stage 260, the host
execution environment rejects the link selection. In some implementations, when a link selection
is rejected at stage 260, the application provides feedback to the user indicating that the link
selection was rejected. For example, the application may pop a warning window stating that the
selection was rejected. In some such instances, the warning window might include an
opportunity to confirm the user’s intent to select the link (e.g., showing the actual destination of
the link selected). In some implementations, the application rejects the link silently such that,
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from the user perspective, it is as though no link was selected at all. In some implementations, if
the protected link is presented in close proximity to the rejected link selection, the protected link
is selected in lieu of the rejected link (unless the rejected link is, itself, marked for the special
protected status).
In the above description of FIG. 2, a protected link anywhere in an electronic document
would trigger the elevated criteria analysis in stage 240. In some implementations, when a
selectable element marked for the special protected status is presented by the client device, only
selection events proximate to the protected element are subjected to the screening process.
In this manner, if the selection event is directed to a link in a visual element that had been
recently moved (e.g., within a preset number of seconds prior to the selection), action on the
selection is blocked. If the selection event is directed to a link in a visual element that is marked
transparent, action on the selection is blocked.
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